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Impact on U. S. Economy
　The strict ﬁscal norm in the BCA has weighed heavily on the traditional appropriation 
process. First, I will evaluate the real impact of cutting discretionary programs on econom-
ic issue. As shown in Table 3, discretionary outlays for both defense and non-defense pro-
grams have increased less than total outlays on average, or mandatory programs, as the 
result of ceiling by the CAP. Restraining or cutting discretionary spending has had adverse 
eﬀects on U. S. macro-economic performance. Peter G. Peterson Fund estimated the econom-
ic impact of restriction in discretionary spending as the following : It decreased GDP 
growth rate by 0.7％, raised unemployment rate by 0.8％, and deprived employment by 
（　　）
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1.2 million （Macroeconomic Advisors ［2013］）. Even the International Monetary Fund, an 
admirer of ﬁscal austerity, has warned that the over-biased deﬁcit reduction in cutting dis-
cretionary has blocked investments in physical and human capital for the future, leading 
the U. S. economy into stagnation （IMF ［2014］）.
　President Obama also reminisced that he had not been able to make capital investments, 
although they have been necessary. “The fact of the matter is,” he said, “that our failure in 
2012, 2013, 2014, to initiate a massive infrastructure project ― it was the perfect time to do 
it ; low interest rates, construction industry is still on its heels, massive need ― the fact that 
we failed to do that, for example, cost us time （Sorkin ［2016］）.”
Impact on Discretionary Program
　The impact of restrictive discretionary spending is not just on macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Restrictive discretionary spending has had serious impacts not only on the U. S. 
macro economy, but also on the micro-budgets of each program. On defense programs, the 
Pentagon manage to scrap together its fund through a variety of almost improvisational 
measures, such as : Shifting some program accounts into the Overseas Contingency Opera-
tions （OCO） accounts
1）
, which is excluded from the CAP ; temporary cutting the force struc-
ture ; cancelling or shortening unit training for those units not preparing to deploy ; post-
poning planned depot maintenance of equipment or repair and non-urgent renovations of 
facilities ; stretching out the procurement or R&D plans or slowing modernization of arms 
（Belasco ［2015a］ : 21―31）. The Department of Defense （DoD） has appealed to the Congress 
and the White House to be excluded from the budget cuts imposed by the strict CAP so 
that it could perform its designated missions （DoD ［2014］）.
　The CAP and sequestration have also had adverse eﬀects on non-defense programs. Har-
ry Stein, the Director of ﬁscal policy at the Center for American Progress, reported that 
the eﬀect of the strict rules on discretionary has restrained or cut programs such as subsi-
（　　）
Table 3 : The Rate of Increase in Federal Outlays by Major Spending Categories : FY 2008=100
FY
Discretionary Outlay Mandatory Outlay
Net 
Interest
Total 
OutlayDefense Non Defense
Social 
Security Healthcare
Other 
Mandatory
2008 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
2009 107 111 111 115 188  74 118
2010 112 126 114 122 125  78 116
2011 114 124 118 129 138  91 121
2012 109 118 125 122 138  87 119
2013 102 110 132 129 117  87 116
2014  97 111 138 140 109  91 118
2015  95 112 144 158 124  88 124
Source : CBO ［2016］.
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dies to state and local governments for education or water supply systems, the subsidy of 
aﬀordable housing, or funds to support college students like Pell Grant. The federal govern-
ment, he said, has not been able to help the middle class cope with the economy after the 
Great Recession because of the strict CAP and the threat of sequestration （Stein ［2015］）.
Improvisational Appropriation Process
　Second, the ﬁscal norm in the BCA has changed the appropriation decision-making pro-
cess into the one that is unstable and improvisational. Table 4 shows how extra measures 
have been added to the appropriation process to fund the government, such as continuing 
resolutions （CRs） and omnibus appropriation acts. In the regular appropriations process, 
Congress has to pass the 12 regular appropriation bills annually. When the Congress and 
the president cannot approve the bills by start of new ﬁscal year, one or more CRs are 
（　　）
Table 4 : Summary of Continuing Resolutions and Omnibus Appropriation Acts : FY 1998―2016
Fiscal 
Year
Continuing Resolutions Omnibus Appropriation
The Number 
of CR
Total 
Duration in 
Days
The Number of Regular Appropriation Acts Enacted Date of 
Omnibus 
Appropriation 
Act
Enacted by 
Start of FY
Enacted as 
Freestanding 
Measures
Enacted in 
Omnibus 
Measures
1998  6  57 1 13  0
1999  6  21 1  5  8 Oct. 21
2000  7  63 4  8  5 Nov. 29
2001 21  82 2  8  5 Oct. 27 ; Dec. 21
2002  8 102 0 13  0
2003  8 143 0  2 11 Feb. 20
2004  5 123 3  6  7 Jan. 23
2005  3  69 1  4  9 Dec. 8
2006  3  92 2 11  0
2007  4 365 1  2  0
2008  4  92 0  1 11 Dec. 26
2009  2 162 3  0 12 Sep. 30 ; Mar. 11
2010  2  79 1  6  6 Dec. 16
2011  8 365 0  1  0
2012  5  84 0  0 12 Nov. 18 ; Dec. 23
2013  2 365 0  0 12 Mar. 26
2014  4 110 0  0 12 Jan. 17
2015  3  76 0  0 12 Dec. 16
2016  3  78 0  0 12 Dec. 18
Source :
Tollestrup ［2014a］,
Tollestrup ［2014b］,
Congress. gov, Appropriations （https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/Appropriations+for+Fiscal+Year+2017）
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used to provide funding for a speciﬁed period of time. While CRs have been used before 
the BCA became low, as shown in Table 4, passing CRs have been much more diﬃcult 
and common since the BCA. Normally, passing CRs is simply a technical and temporary 
process because they provide short-term funding equal to the level of the previous ﬁscal 
year’s appropriations. By contrast, under the BCA, making CRs has become a source of po-
litical conﬂict, as some legislators have linked passing the CR with politically controversial 
policies that they wanted to push through the legislative process.
　In the fall of 2013, the congressional Republicans refused to pass the CR that funded 
Obamacare, which should have come into eﬀect at the beginning of FY 2014, but the fail-
ure to pass the CR shut the federal government down for two weeks. In 2015, some con-
servatives resist passing the unconditional CR, because it included funding for the Planned 
Parenthood, the non-proﬁt organization for women, which they accused to have been in-
volved with the illegal prescription of abortion. While congressional leaders between both 
parties barely passed the unconditional CR, they paid the price of the resignation of Speak-
er Boehner. Making CRs has become an exhausting and risky process.
　Another extra measures of appropriation process under the BCA is dependence on omni-
bus appropriation acts. As in Table 4, no regular appropriation act has been enacted into 
law since the BCA, and all of them have been consolidated in omnibus acts. One of the 
main reasons of using the extra ordinary measures is because of the strict CAP and the 
threat of sequestration. Passing appropriations within the CAP was entangled, as it was 
impossible for polarized Congress to agree with which programs should be cut. In 2013, 
because the Congress and the president failed to make a deal with the appropriation with-
in the CAP, sequester was in fact triggered. Congressional leaders and the president, 
thereafter, made every eﬀort to establish the law raising the CAP in order to avoid se-
quester. They had to make additional deﬁcit reduction schemes in order to raise the CAP, 
because some conservatives have ﬁrmly resisted raising the CAP without making any 
spending cuts. Because of the strict CAP rule, there was no way for Congress to begin the 
appropriation process without the law raising the CAP, realized as the Bipartisan Budget 
Act of 2013 and 2015 （the BBA of 2013, the BBA of 2015）.
　In these ways, the appropriation process has become unstable and improvisational since 
the beginning of the BCA. In the late 1980s, under the GRH, the strict target of deﬁcit re-
duction and the threat of sequestration led budget makers to use gimmicks. Allen Schick 
called the budget process under the GRH “improvisational budgeting （Schick ［1990］ : 160―
162）.” The name of “improvisational budgeting” just ﬁts the situation of the appropriation 
process under the BCA, too. The budgetary process under the BCA is similar to the one 
in the GRH, not just in the characteristics of the enforcement mechanisms, but also in the 
outcomes that it brings to appropriation process.
（　　）
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３―２　Macro-Budgeting Outcomes in the BCA
　I move the view from micro-budgeting to macro-budgeting. Figure 4 shows the compo-
nents of federal outlays by major spending categories, as well as tax revenue and the bud-
get deﬁcit as a percent of GDP. While all discretionary program spending is only 30％ of 
total federal outlays, Social Security and healthcare programs, mainly composed of Medi-
care and Medicaid, account for about half of total outlays. It is clear that we have no way 
to improve budget performance in mid-or long-term without addressing these entitlement 
programs. It means that we have to reduce their beneﬁt level, raise the tax revenue in or-
der to ﬁnance them, or both.
　At the repetitive negotiations between GOP and the president that resulted in the BCA, 
the main ways of deﬁcit reduction at issue were these choices. However, as I said, all of 
these policy options were omitted from the ﬁnal package because of partisan politics. The 
burden of deﬁcit reduction has rested heavily on discretionary programs. It seems clear 
that this disproportional scheme is not a sustainable way to ﬁx the government’s ﬁscal 
problems in the long run. Although the ﬁscal rules in the BCA were designed to force the 
budget makers to reduce budget deﬁcits, they have been far from reasonable way to at-
（　　）
Figure 4 : Revenue, Outlay, and Deﬁcit in the U. S. Federal Government
Percentage of GDP
Source : CBO ［2016］.
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tain the ﬁscal sustainability that should be the original goal in macro-budgeting.
Conclusion
　As the analysis in this paper indicates, I would like to discuss the three implications that 
from this study of federal budgeting under the BCA, and how this process may be re-
formed to improve the budget process for the future.
Fiscal Rules and Political Discretion
　First, the logic that covers the entire budget process under the BCA is the conﬁnement 
of political discretion and brinkmanship politics because of the strict ﬁscal rules. This logic 
is partly rooted in conservative ﬁscal ideology and microeconomics. Public choice theory, 
one of the theoretical foundations of conservative budget policy, has called for the amend-
ing of the Constitution by inserting a balanced budget clause in order to overcome the pa-
thology of our democratic society, otherwise known as the “ﬁscal illusion （Buchanan, Row-
ley and Tllison ［1990］）.” The linkage of deﬁcit reduction with statutory debt limits, or the 
CAP with the threat of sequestration is connected to this theory.
　This logic is not limited to conservatives. Some moderates or liberals, such as the Bipar-
tisan Policy Center, the Committee for Responsible Federal Budget, or Peter G. Peterson 
Foundations ― some members of these think tanks took central part in the report of the 
Bowls-Simpson Commission
2）
 ― also view the ﬁscal norm to be superior to politics. They also 
share the pessimistic notion that the Congress and the president can never make any deal 
with diﬃcult choice in front of the current huge deﬁcit.
　As I made clear in the paper, however, the tightened ﬁscal norm asserted by “ﬁscal 
hawks” has led legislators to brinkmanship politics and to the inclination toward ﬁscal au-
tonomy. Then, this has resulted in improvisational budgeting and dysfunction of the ordi-
nary budget process. The legislators should remember the lesson of 1990, when the Con-
gress and the president focused on making of budgeting rules that allowed for policy 
discretion, and produced the new way of budgeting of the BEA by learning from the fail-
ures in the GRH. It is the time to restore the political discretion and feasibility of the bud-
get process by releasing them from the forced ﬁscal rules.
The Relationship between Macro-and Micro-Budgeting
　Second, we should reconsider not just how the ﬁscal norm is applied, but also the rela-
tionship between the appropriation process and the macro-budgeting rules. As I said, the 
macro-budgeting rules in the BCA, such as the linkage of deﬁcit reduction with debt limit 
or the CAP with sequester, has created a dysfunctional appropriation process. Adding it, 
omitting entitlements and revenue clauses from the deﬁcit reduction scheme, the macro-
budgeting rules under the BCA have produced a process that has done little to attain the 
（　　）
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long term ﬁscal sustainability, which is the main goal in macro-budgeting.
　Confronting a dysfunctional budgetary process under the BCA, some congressmen and 
budget specialists are discussing how to restore the budget process, proposing a variety of 
reform plans : Biannual budgeting, joint budget resolutions, the introduction of “portfolio 
budgeting,” new targets to maintain ﬁscal sustainability, such as the rate of debt per GDP, 
etc. （Meyers ［2016］, Posner ［2016］）. These proposals should be considered and sorted 
from the distinction of the two goals between macro-and micro-budgeting, while I cannot 
evaluate in detail each of the reform proposals here.
　In addition, we can refer to several historical experiences to improve the relationship be-
tween macro-and micro-budgeting. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, the most recent compre-
hensive tax reform, was guided through the legislative process by the spirit of “revenue 
neutral”― and as a result “deﬁcit neutral” outcome. The plans of what to change in the 
tax code or the tax base were discussed in the way to separate them from deﬁcit issue in 
the lawmaking. By omitting the deﬁcit reduction, decision-makers could concentrate on the 
tax issues themselves, the enactment of the law created the stable revenue regime （U. S. 
Senate ［2010］）. Another example is the legislative process produced the Social Security 
Reform Act of 1983, led by the Greenspan Commission. In the discussion of the reform, the 
arguments were conﬁned to Social Security program itself, separating it from other federal 
programs. The law has overcome the urgent crisis of Social Security ﬁnancing, and has se-
cured its mid-term sustainability since then. Learning from these historical lessons, it might 
be a better way for legislators to separate the issue of each program from the deﬁcit re-
duction issue and to focus on what program itself to be in policy making process.
Restoring Budget Process under the Polarized and Vulnerable Politics
　Finally, what should political leaders do, should they be given the policy discretion identi-
ﬁed in the paper ? The most pressing issue in current politics is diﬃculty in reaching bi-
partisan agreement. Some political realist theorists or journalists point out that the cause of 
disagreement is the lack of the leadership demonstrated by the president or by the con-
gressional leaders （Bartels ［2012］, Woodward ［2012］）. However, they overlook or underes-
timate the structural change in current polarized politics. The extent of the current parti-
san conﬂicts is too great to lay the blame for the failure to achieve a bipartisan deal into 
inaction of the leadership.
　First, political conﬂict has turned from interest based into ideology based. In the old poli-
tics, political leaders could settle a bipartisan package through getting the votes from some 
reluctant congressmen in exchange for something to satisfying their speciﬁc interests. In 
the current politics, however, conservative congressmen have opposed the use of ear-
marked appropriations, and they have refused to comprise their ideological positions. The 
partisan conﬂict, as a result, has tend to be ideologically based, making the bipartisan ne-
gotiation process among political leaders uncompromising （Grossmann and Hopkins ［2014a］, 
（　　）
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［2014b
3）
］）.
　Second, the uncompromising behavior of some legislators has been motivated by their 
vulnerability to the public, outside of the Washington politics. The in-house politics, which 
Theodore Lowi characterized as “iron triangle,” has transferred into open politics to the 
outside of Washington
4）
. It should be understand that the uncompromising partisan politics 
and the policy deadlock have been caused by a vulnerable politics to polarized public opin-
ion.
　As showed in Table 5, the GOP leaders have not been able to get the majority vote 
within their own party on the main bipartisan budget bills that have become public law, 
all of which were introduced by Republican leadership into the House ﬂoor. The main rea-
son was that many Tea Party aﬃliates and the GOP congressmen vulnerable to reelection 
have voted against the bills （refer to average Y/N rate, the last line in Table 5）. This 
ideologically based behavior and the vulnerability to reelection within the House GOP has 
made bipartisan compromise diﬃcult.
　Based on the understanding that the current budget politics have turned into the ideo-
logically based polarization and that turning back to the old in-house politics has been im-
possible, it would be insuﬃcient just to return into the ﬁscal norm under the BEA, which 
was settled based upon the bipartisan budget summit between the leaders of both of the 
Congress and the president （Schick ［2007］ : 22―26）. We need to ﬁnd out the new way to 
lead to a bipartisan budget agreement under the new political structure. Although the de-
tailed work on the issues remains to the coming, we need reasonable and accountable bud-
get information, rules, or process ﬁtting to the new political age, not just for budget mak-
ers, but also for the public who are watching Washington.
Notes :
1）　Since 2001, the terror attack in Sept. 11, the war funding by DoD has been designated as 
the OCO. The OCO fund has been exempted from the CAP. More in detail, refer to Belasco 
［2015b］.
2）　At the start of 2010, Obama established the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and 
Reform （NCFRR）, called a Bowls-Simpson Commission, bearing the name of co-chairman, in or-
der to ﬁx the budget deﬁcit issue. While the Commission released the comprehensive deﬁcit re-
duction plan to the president on Dec. of 2010, the report just remained in a blueprint （NCFRR 
［2010］）.
3）　Grossmann and Hopkins focus on the organizational asymmetry between Republican and 
Democrat. That is, Republican likes to unite under the ideological goal, such as small govern-
ment or balanced budget, evaluating each policy based on ideologically oriented view. By con-
trast, Democrat is organized based on a variety of interests required by economic or social ad-
vocacy groups （Grossmann and Hopkins ［2014a］）. While their assertion is true of the current 
organization of both parties, we should take notice of that the behavior of Democrat has also 
become ideological with reaction to the conservatives in long term perspective.
（　　）
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4）　Samuel Kernell said that U. S. federal politics has changed from “institutionalized pluralism” 
into “individualized pluralism” since 1970s. According from this view, he focuses on the higher 
ability of president’s commitment to policymaking through calling the public, named “going 
public strategy” （Kernell ［2007］ : 33―45）. As well as president’s going to public, we should 
think that congressional politics has gained its openness to the outside, too.
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